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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






WILLIAM D. TURNER, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA;  
SHIRLEY MOORE, SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS; 
ROBERT B. MACINTYRE, CHIEF EXAMINER FOR DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS; MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, SUPERINTENDENT SCI 
GRATERFORD; MARY CANINO, GRATERFORD HEARING EXAMINER; 
LIEUTENANT MR. KNAPP, AT SCI GRATERFORD; LIEUTENANT JOHN DOE, 
AT SCI GRATERFORD; SERGEANT MR. C. PHIPPS, AT GRATERFORD;  
WENDY SHAYLOR, AT SCI GRATERFORD; MS. T. FANRAK, UNIT MANAGER 
AT GRATERFORD; MS. S. O'MARA, AT SCI GRATERFORD; 
JOHN/JANE DOE, ALSO UNIT MANAGER MEDICAL DEPARTMENT  
FOR CORRECTIONS, P.A. AT GRATERFORD DURING SICK CALL; 
WHITE MALE NURSE JOHN DOE; STAFF AT SCI MAHANOY, AS WELL AS 
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; TONY INUZZY; 
MARVA CERULLO; PRISON HEALTH SYSTEMS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-01701) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 21, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 









 William D. Turner, a state inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Mahanoy in 
Frackville, Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting Appellees‟ motion to 
dismiss his second amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and denying his 
post-judgment motions.  Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we 
will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  On July 27, 2010, Turner was transferred to SCI Graterford, refused 
to be housed with a cell mate, and received a misconduct write-up from Lieutenant 
Knapp and Sergeant Phipps.  After a disciplinary hearing held before Hearing Examiner 
Canino, Turner pled guilty and received thirty days in disciplinary custody.  According to 
Turner, this write-up and hearing violated his due process and equal protection rights. 
Turner was released from disciplinary custody on August 12 or 13, 2010 and was 
returned to the general population, where he was placed in the top bunk of a double cell 
despite a doctor‟s note in his possession stating that Turner was to have lower bunk 
status.  According to Turner, Unit Managers O‟Mara and Fanrak violated his Eighth 
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Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by placing him in a top 
bunk.  Turner also alleges that he suffered foot and leg injuries and anxiety attacks after 
being placed in a double cell.  Furthermore, he argues that nurses John and Jane Doe 
failed to take action despite being presented with his doctor‟s note and that Wendy 
Shaylor violated his rights by stating that such a note was not included in his records at 
SCI Graterford.  Finally, Turner alleges that upon his return to SCI Mahanoy, physician‟s 
assistant Inuzzy violated his Eighth Amendment rights by taking away his lower bunk 
status, thereby causing Turner to fall and suffer a torn rotator cuff. 
On December 29, 2010, Turner filed this civil rights action in the Court of 
Common Pleas for Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.  In March 2011, Appellees filed a 
notice of removal to remove Turner‟s complaint to the District Court.  Appellees filed a 
motion to dismiss Turner‟s complaint on March 21, 2011, and approximately a month 
later, Turner filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  On May 13, 2011, 
the District Court granted Turner leave to file an amended complaint and denied 
Appellees‟ motion to dismiss without prejudice. 
Turner filed his first amended complaint on May 24, 2011.  In response, Appellees 
filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the District Court on March 20, 2012.  
However, the District Court gave Turner leave to file a second amended complaint by 
April 6, 2012.  Turner filed his second amended complaint on April 4, 2012.  Appellees 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and on June 27, 2012, the District 
Court granted Appellees‟ motion and dismissed Turner‟s second amended complaint with 
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prejudice.  Turner subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings relating to 
summary judgment and a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the 
judgment, both of which were denied by the District Court on August 3, 2012.  Turner 
then timely filed his notice of appeal as to the District Court‟s June 27, 2012 and August 
3, 2012 orders. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  This 
Court affirms a district court‟s dismissal for failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all 
factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We may affirm the District Court on any basis supported by the record.  
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
III. 
 Section 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal 
law committed by state officials.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  To establish a claim under § 
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1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or 
statutory right by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 The District Court correctly dismissed Turner‟s claims against defendants 
Attorney General, Moore, MacIntyre, and Wenerowicz for lack of personal involvement.  
Liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on the theory of respondeat superior; instead, 
each individual defendant “„must have personal involvement in the alleged 
wrongdoing.‟”  Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 
U.S. 312, 325 (1981).  Here, although Turner names the Attorney General, Moore, 
MacInytre, and Wenerowicz as defendants, his second amended complaint fails to 
establish that they personally directed the alleged violations or had actual knowledge of 
the alleged violations and acquiesced to them. 
 We further agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that the Eleventh 
Amendment provides the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) defendants 
protection from suit in their official capacities.  The Eleventh Amendment protects a state 
or state agency from a federal suit regardless of the relief sought, unless Congress has 
specifically abrogated the state‟s immunity or the state has waived its own immunity.  
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 217 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).  Section 1983 does not abrogate states‟ 
immunity.  See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1979).  Furthermore, 
“[i]ndividual state employees sued in their official capacity are also entitled to Eleventh 
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Amendment immunity.”  Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  We have previously noted that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has 
expressly withheld its consent to be sued.  See Lavia v. Pa. Dep‟t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 
195 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).  Because the DOC is a part of 
Pennsylvania‟s executive department, its employees share in Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to the extent they are sued in their official capacities.  See Will v. Mich. Dep‟t 
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Lavia, 224 F.3d at 195. 
 Turner alleges that Knapp and Phipps violated his right to due process when they 
denied his request for self-confinement under Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
Administrative Directive (“DC-ADM”) 802 and issued him a misconduct for disobeying 
an order to be housed with a cell mate.  He also alleges that Canino violated his due 
process rights during his disciplinary hearing. Although Turner‟s allegations do not 
distinguish between substantive due process and procedural due process, we consider 
each in turn. 
  Certain fundamental rights are substantively protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s due process clause.  See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 
1990).  A claim alleging a substantive due process violation requires a showing of 
behavior that can “properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking.”  Cnty. 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); see also Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 
775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Conduct can violate substantive due process if it shocks the 
conscience, which encompasses only the most egregious official conduct.”).  Here, the 
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District Court properly dismissed Turner‟s substantive due process claim because Knapp, 
Phipps, and Camino‟s conduct was not arbitrary and did not “„shock[] the conscience.‟”  
Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United Artists Theatre 
Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003)).  It was within 
Knapp and Phipps‟ discretion to deny Turner‟s request for administrative custody and to 
issue a misconduct for disobeying an order and within Camino‟s discretion to determine 
whether Turner was in fact guilty. 
 Procedural due process protection “for a state created liberty interest . . . is limited 
to those situations where deprivation of that interest „imposes atypical and significant 
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.‟”  Griffin v. 
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995)).  No liberty interest is implicated where the state action does not “present a 
dramatic departure from the basic conditions of confinement.”  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.; 
see also Burns v. Pa. Dep‟t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]nmates are 
generally not entitled to procedural due process in prison disciplinary hearings because 
the sanctions resulting from those hearings do not usually affect a protected liberty 
interest.”).  State regulations, such as those contained in DC-ADM 802, own their own do 
not create a due process liberty interest. See Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708.  Here, Turner‟s 
thirty-day confinement in administrative custody does not constitute an atypical or 
significant hardship.  See id. (“[E]xposure to the conditions of administrative custody for 
periods of as long as 15 months . . . did not deprive [the inmate] of a liberty interest and 
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[] he was not entitled to procedural due process protection.”).  Accordingly, the District 
Court correctly dismissed Turner‟s procedural due process claims against Knapp, Phipps, 
and Canino.  
 Turner next alleges that he was denied equal protection of the law when he 
received disciplinary custody and when he was assigned a top bunk in a double cell.  We 
agree with the District Court that Turner has insufficiently pled this claim because he has 
not provided evidence that he received treatment different than that received by other 
similarly situated individuals.  Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Finally, Turner alleges that defendants Shaylor, Farnak, O‟Mara, John Doe, Jane 
Doe, and Inuzzy
1
 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment by not providing adequate medical care even though he possessed a doctor‟s 
note stating that he was to have lower bunk status.  Specifically, Turner states that he 
suffered physical injuries and anxiety attacks because of this inadequate care. 
 To plead an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that defendants displayed deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.  
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 
108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103) (“Only „unnecessary and wanton 
                                              
1
  The proper venue for Turner‟s claims against Inuzzy and staff at SCI Mahanoy is the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(b).  Although the District Court should have dismissed this claim without prejudice 
to Turner‟s re-filing it in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, we conclude that such error 
is harmless because, as discussed below, Turner‟s claim has no merit. 
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infliction of pain‟ or „deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs‟ of prisoners 
are sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”). 
 With regards to Shaylor, we have previously noted that non-medical officials are 
entitled to rely on medical professionals‟ judgment.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 
236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison 
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical 
prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter 
requirement of deliberate indifference.”); Durmer v. O‟Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Turner‟s second amended complaint does not plead any facts or present any 
documentation suggesting that Shaylor was aware of the doctor‟s note assigning him to 
lower bunk status; indeed, he seeks to hold Shaylor liable simply for stating that such a 
note was not part of his record at SCI Graterford.  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly dismissed Turner‟s claim as to Shaylor. 
 While a prison official may violate the Eighth Amendment by “intentionally 
interfering with [medical] treatment once prescribed,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 & n.12, 
Eighth Amendment liability cannot be based on simple negligence or lack of due care, 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-39 (1994).  “It is well-settled that claims of 
negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not 
constitute „deliberate indifference.‟”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Here, Turner‟s second amended complaint fails to establish that Farnak, O‟Mara, John 
Doe, Jane Doe, and Inuzzy were deliberately indifferent to his health.  Notably, while 
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Turner has attached a 1996 doctor‟s note assigning lower bunk status that was approved 
by medical staff at SCI Greene, he himself states that a unit manager informed John Doe 
that there was nothing in his medical or prison record at SCI Graterford to indicate that he 
had lower bunk status.  Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Turner‟s 
Eighth Amendment claims because he did not demonstrate that Farnak, O‟Mara, John 
Doe, Jane Doe, and Inuzzy knew about, let alone disregarded, his lower bunk status. 
 After the District Court dismissed his second amended complaint with prejudice, 
Turner filed a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Relating to Summary Judgment.”  
Accordingly, the District Court properly denied this motion.  Turner also filed a “59(e) 
Motion to alter or Amend Judgment,” alleging that his second amended complaint should 
not have been dismissed because he had demonstrated that the defendants had caused his 
injuries and because the District Court had overlooked some of his claims.  However, 
because Turner was requesting relief from the District Court‟s final judgment, the District 
Court properly treated his motion as one pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and denied it 
because Turner had not identified the basis for his requested relief.  See Ahmed v. 
Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (courts may construe post-judgment 
motions as Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) motions). 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Turner‟s motion 
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for appointment of counsel is denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
